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This paper argues that a fundamental antagonism between democracy and
nondemocracy organises lay thinking on global issues. We review key ﬁnd-
ings of a long-standing experimental research programme that examined
the “Democracy-as-value” hypothesis across a variety of political and social
contexts. This hypothesis contends that democracy is an ideological belief
system that provides value to democratic individuals, groups, and institutions
and thereby grants legitimacy to their actions. Based on procedural justice
theories and social representations theory, we contend that western lay
perceivers associate democracy with procedural equality and individual
autonomy, whereas nondemocracy is associated with ingroup hierarchy
and conformity. We discuss how idealised representations of democracy jus-
tify global power arrangements and emphasise the paradoxical justiﬁcation
function of democratic values through which nondemocratic forms of social
regulation based on physical force are legitimised with the very democratic
norms that call for peaceful resolution of conﬂicts.‘In the case of a word like democracy, not only is there no
agreed deﬁnition, but the attempt to make one is resisted
from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when we call
a country democratic we are praising it: consequently the
defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democ-
racy, and fear that they might have to stop using that word
if it were tied down to any one meaning.Words of this kind
are often used in a consciously dishonest way. That is, the
person who uses them has his own private deﬁnition, but
allows his hearer to think he means something quite
different’— (George Orwell, 1946, p. 257).
For centuries, democracy has been a cornerstone of
Western political thinking. Following the Enlighten-
ment period and its vision of the sovereign individual,
democracy has gradually developed into a universal
principle of political modernity. Famous statements
about democracy are Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg
address in 1863 where he claimed that democracy is
“a government of the people, by the people, for the
people”, and Winston Churchill’s statement in 1947
that “democracy is the worst form of government
except all those other forms that have been tried from
time to time”. Such quotes illustrate that Western soci-
eties have long cherished the idea of democracy as a
superior political system. More recently, Amartya Sen
(1999) has taken the meaning of democracy beyondEuropean Journalits political understanding and claimed that democracy
is a universal value that “includes its intrinsic impor-
tance in human life, its instrumental role in generating
political incentives, and its constructive function in the
formation of values” (p.16).
Notwithstanding this apparent consensus concerning
the moral high ground of democracy, the opening quote
by George Orwell reminds us that the meaning of de-
mocracy has always been contested, and that it goes far
beyond a mere description of the political organisation
of a society. While many accord democracy a positive
valence, what exactly is meant by it depends on the par-
ticular perspectives and circumstances in which the
word is used. Democracy not only refers to a set of
political procedures, but also implies the endorsement
of social and moral values (Brettschneider, 2006; Post,
2006; Sen, 1999), as, “people are embracing democracy
not only as a system of government, but also as a value”
(McFaul, 2004, p. 152). Democracy thereby incorporates
a value system that informs many people’s evaluations
about “good” and “bad” behaviour by citizens as well
as about “good” and “bad” governance by governments.
In the present article, we adopt a social representa-
tions perspective (Moscovici, 1988; Sammut, Andreouli,
Gaskell, & Valsiner, 2015) by examining how shared
representations of democracy inform lay thinking about
the world and its inhabitants. Based on the conviction
that contemporary social psychology should examineof Social Psychology 45 (2015) 896–906 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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global categories, we show how idealised representa-
tions of democracy at the lay level are translated into
antagonistic stereotypes of global categories, juxtaposing
the simpliﬁed images of democratic populations to ste-
reotypes of nondemocratic populations.While acknowl-
edging the potentially inclusionary and empowering
functions of democracy in other contexts, the present
approach focuses on the “dark side” of democracy
and on its exclusionary and justiﬁcatory functions
(see Rosenmann, 2015).
The “democracy-as-value” research programme has
demonstrated that democracy is an ideological belief
system that provides intrinsic value to democratic indi-
viduals, groups, and institutions, therefore granting
legitimacy to their actions, whatever the nature and moral
justiﬁcation of that action may actually be (Falomir-Pichastor,
Staerklé, Pereira, & Butera, 2012). In particular, we
contend that in Western countries such as Switzerland
(where most of the studies were carried out) representa-
tions of democracy can be invoked to legitimise hostile
acts against nondemocratic groups. We also suggest that
the inﬂuence of democracy-as-value on judgements of
social categories is not limited to political judgements of
countries, but that it also infuses judgements of groups
inmundane settings through establishing amoral hierar-
chy between groups based on their internal organisation.GLOBALVALUE PERCEPTIONS
Following Middle Age explorations that revealed the
existence of hitherto unknown human populations,
Europeans have come to consider themselves as eco-
nomically, politically, and morally superior compared
to non-Europeans. Arguably, the antagonism between
democracy and nondemocracy represents the political
facet of a range of antagonistic stereotypes at the global
level, including the opposition between the East and the
West (Said, 1978), between civilisation and savagery
(Jahoda, 1999), or between the Christian and Muslim
world (Yilmaz & Ayka, 2011). These stereotype pairs
can be seen as partially overlapping instances of global
value perceptions developed and disseminated by
Western powers. They associate respectively positive
and negative value to social categories spread out over
the entire world.
However, a crucial difference sets the global juxta-
position of democratic and nondemocratic contexts
apart from other intergroup hierarchies. When judg-
ing organised groups such as countries (as opposed
to social categories in general), people do not only
have a stereotype of a speciﬁc group in mind, but also
think of the organisational structure of these groups.
Applied to judgements of countries, people think of
different ways of politically organising a society as a
function of the roles attributed to national populations
and governments. That is, they think of issues of social
order and political legitimacy. We further suggest that
this perceived polarity between a democratic and a
nondemocratic ideal-type of social order has becomeEuropean Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 896–906 Copyright © 2015 John Wileya powerful organising principle of international repre-
sentations. As such, democracy represents the norma-
tive ideal of a social order in which a population of
allegedly rational and equal citizens spontaneously
organises into an orderly society that collectively de-
cides by whom it wishes to be governed. The basic pri-
macy of the individual over the group in the West is a
key characteristic of liberal political philosophy that has
led to this widespread common sense assumption that
liberal democracy constitutes the normal, “good” social
order (see Moscovici, 1986; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).LAY THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIC AND
NONDEMOCRATIC POPULATIONS AND
GOVERNMENTS
In order to compare representations of a democratic and
a nondemocratic social order, a ﬁrst series of experi-
mental studies investigated the perceived relationship
between democratic and nondemocratic populations
and governments (Staerklé, Clémence, & Doise, 1998).
Participants were asked to estimate human rights re-
spect in a ﬁctitious nation characterised only as having
a democratic or a nondemocratic government and a ne-
gotiating (i.e. orderly) or clashing (i.e. unruly) citizenry.
The respective stereotypes of orderly vs. unruly were
contextualised in the instruction “Think of a country
in which the inhabitants are quite orderly [unruly]
and resolve their conﬂicts often by discussion [clashes].”
We chose these attributes to highlight a stereotypically
democratic order in which competing interests and con-
ﬂicts are negotiated through (rational) discussion and
debate, in opposition to a stereotypically nondemocratic
order in which different segments of the population
clash with each other over their disagreements.
The ﬁndings of a ﬁrst study showed that judgements
of countries with democratic governments were simi-
lar to judgements of countries with orderly popula-
tions, but different from the other pair of countries
deﬁned by nondemocratic governments or unruly
populations. In another study, population and govern-
ment types were crossed. This study showed that
human rights were perceived to be well respected only
in countries with democratic governments inhabited
by orderly (i.e. democratic) inhabitants, and much less
so in democratic countries with unruly (i.e. nondemo-
cratic) inhabitants.
These results suggest that for these participants, a dem-
ocratic country is truly democratic only when its popula-
tion matches the stereotype of an orderly democratic
population. For nondemocratic governments, the type
of population did not affect judgements, indicating a
greater role attributed to nondemocratic compared with
democratic governments. Other ﬁndings of these studies
conﬁrmed this pattern: human rights respect was associ-
ated with the population resisting a rights-violating
government in democratic, but not in nondemocratic
contexts, suggesting that political citizen activism in non-
democratic contexts was perceived as inconsequential.& Sons, Ltd. 897
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had clear expectations as to the type of population who
inhabit democratic or nondemocratic countries, an
expectation possibly based on opposing lay theories of
democratic and nondemocratic social order. They also
suggest that respondents explicitly valued a democratic
societal organisation in which respect of human rights
at least partially resulted from a politically active demo-
cratic population rather than from a fair government.
Another study assessed stereotype content spontane-
ously associated with democratic and nondemocratic
populations, using the same vignettes as above (Staerklé,
2005). In these open-ended questions, free, independent,
democratic, open-minded, egalitarian, and responsible were
the most frequently quoted attributes of democratic in-
habitants, whereas submissive, unhappy, powerless, not free,
poor, dependent, and easy to manipulate were the typical
attributes of nondemocratic populations. These ﬁndings
suggest that stereotypes of nondemocratic populations
are construed as a violation of the democratic values of
individual freedom and independence (see Biernat &
Vescio, 2005; Joffe & Staerklé, 2007).
Taken together, these studies provide converging,
albeit indirect, evidence of the existence of lay theories
about democratic and nondemocratic forms of social
order. Deﬁning a democratic social order in contrast
to a nondemocratic social order is a strategy to high-
light the positive attributes of democratic populations
(e.g., self-determination, civility, freedom, and equal-
ity) and the negative attributes of nondemocratic pop-
ulations (e.g., submissiveness, obedience, poverty, and
unruliness). Such dual representations anchored in
common sense knowledge about “democracy” may
give individuals the impression of familiarity and under-
standing of remote and unknown countries that are
simply represented as “nondemocratic” (see Herrmann,
Voss, Schooler, & Ciarrochi, 1997, for a similar argu-
ment concerning stereotypic images of countries). Said
(1978) made a related point when he observed that,
for the West, the Orient was a “mute” outgroup without
the right to voice, thus employed by the West to project
characteristics useful to sustain the self and public image
of a free, equal, and civilised West.1Our focus on procedural equality in lay deﬁnitions of democracy
does not imply that other characteristics (e.g., the respect of
minority, social, and civil rights) would be less important in actual
deﬁnitions of democracy (see Shapiro, 2003). Likewise, it does not
imply that Western countries are only or predominantly egalitarian,
since countries mix egalitarian and hierarchical characteristics
(see Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).THE IDEOLOGICAL PREFERENCE FOR
EQUALITY OVER HIERARCHY
The ﬁndings of these studies suggest that the political
organisation of a society determined the perceived
characteristics of its citizens. The more democratic a
country, the more its inhabitants were evaluated as
possessing positive and desirable attributes. Still, these
studies did not clarify how this core value of democ-
racy and its nondemocratic counterpart affected social
judgements. We reasoned that this issue could only
be understood by examining judgements other than
those directly related to actual country judgements
and international relations. We therefore developed
another experimental paradigm that would not be
based on judgements of actual countries, but wouldEuropean Journal898rely on a more formal manipulation of key characteris-
tics of democratic and nondemocratic forms of group
organisation. In order to develop such a paradigm, an
operational key feature of democracy was required.
Most normative accounts of democracy converge in
the idea that formal or procedural equality between group
members is a necessary characteristic of democratic
governance (see Habermas, 1994). In deliberative theo-
ries, for example, democracy requires members to hold
equal power and equal opportunity to access political
inﬂuence. That is, in order to reach a legitimate
democratic decision, group members should all have
an equal chance to voice their distinctive views, with
group leaders having only a subsidiary role (Myers &
Mendelberg, 2013). More generally, procedural equal-
ity can be deﬁned as the equal weight of judgements
of all members of a community on a given matter,
resulting in majority rule (see for example Dahl,
1989). This classical view of democratic decision-making
is consistent with liberal political philosophy that
considers the individual as the ultimate bearer of rights.
Democratic citizens are therefore seen as equal and
sovereign individuals, capable of taking informed
decisions without being subjected to political or other
authorities. This normative view of democratic gover-
nance is (implicitly) contrasted with nondemocratic
forms of governance deﬁned by large power differentials
between group members and leaders and by unilateral
decision-making by nondemocratic leaders. An author-
itarian government follows the principles of a hierarchi-
cal social order by controlling a citizenry construed as
passive and submissive.1
Research on procedural justice, in turn, suggests that
people generally prefer an egalitarian order to a hierar-
chical order. At least in Western countries, the formal
right and actual opportunity to voice one’s concerns
and to actively participate in the decision-making pro-
cess are key determinants of perceived procedural jus-
tice (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975;
Tyler & Lind, 1992). In idealised views of democracy
where all citizens have their say, individual citizens feel
as valued and respected group members (Tyler, 2011).
A recent survey study conﬁrmed that direct popular
voice exerted on political authorities is particularly
attractive in Western European countries: Adolescent
respondents across 18 European countries perceived
direct democracy as the fairest decision-making proce-
dure, followed by group representation, representative
democracy, and oligarchy (Ellenbroek, Verkuyten, Thijs,
& Poppe, 2014).
Based on these political and psychological beneﬁts
of procedural equality, in Western contexts theof Social Psychology 45 (2015) 896–906 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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should be more positive than the valence granted to
nondemocratic-hierarchical groups. Studies in France
and Switzerland have shown that the psychological at-
tributes necessary for an egalitarian order such as inde-
pendence, autonomy, and rationality were more valued
than hierarchy-reﬂecting attributes such as obedience,
conformity, and compliance (Beauvois, 2005; Lorenzi-
Cioldi, 1998). This liberal view of the individual is
arguably part of a hegemonic social representation that
informs common sense conceptions of democracy
(Moscovici, 1986; Sampson, 1988). As a result, at least
in Western societies, egalitarian–democratic groups
should be more desirable and more valued than hierar-
chical-nondemocratic groups, everything else being
equal. This is the basic assumption of the democracy-
as-value hypothesis.
This general ideological preference for an egalitarian
order is however far from absolute. There is abundant re-
search suggesting that undermany circumstances people
actually prefer hierarchical forms of social order: hierar-
chical groups meet motivations for social conformity by
authoritarian individuals (Feldman, 2003), satisfy core
needs of order and control (Friesen, Kay, Eibach, &
Galinsky, 2014) and are seen asmore effective to achieve
group goals (Halevy, Chou, & Galinsky, 2011). Never-
theless, this preference for hierarchical groups seems tied
to speciﬁc circumstances and targeted goals, whereas the
preference for egalitarian groups is likely to be driven by
broader ideological motives and therefore more wide-
spread and deep-seated in Western countries.
The assumption underlying our studies is that this
fundamental preference for (procedurally) egalitarian–
democratic over hierarchical-nondemocratic systems af-
fects not only perceptions of members of these two sys-
tems, but, crucially, also the perceived legitimacy of
their actions. The early studies did not involve an
intergroup design and thus did not examine the conten-
tion that democracy value would provide justiﬁcation for
the self-ascribed political and moral superiority of
democratic countries. Indeed, if democracy is a value rep-
resented by dominant groups, it should play a justiﬁca-
tory role for democratic superiority and by implication,
for actions perpetrated by democratic groups. This is sim-
ilar to the way other dominant values (e.g., meritocracy
or the protestant work ethic) justify the superior
social position of dominant groups who deﬁne them-
selves through these values (Biernat & Vescio, 2005;
Deschamps, 1982; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).THE LEGITIMACY OF DEMOCRATIC ACTIONS
In order to test the above deduction, we investigated
how the key feature of democratic and nondemocratic
social order—equality and hierarchy between group
members—affects judgements of intergroup aggression.
Speciﬁcally, we tested judgements of hostile and aggres-
sive actions perpetrated either by egalitarian–democratic
or by hierarchical–nondemocratic groups, at the ex-
pense of a victim group also deﬁned as either egalitarianEuropean Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 896–906 Copyright © 2015 John Wileyor hierarchical (Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, Depuiset, &
Butera, 2005, 2007).
The studies were explicitly created to mimic real-
world conﬂict between democratic (Western) and non-
democratic (non-Western) countries. In light of this
global context, we wanted to test the hypothesis that
actions taken by democratic actors, even if aggressive,
immoral, or harmful for other groups, were considered
more legitimate than identical actions initiated by non-
democratic groups. The experimental paradigm featured
a scenario in which two summer camp groups, organised
either in an egalitarian or hierarchical way, were in con-
ﬂict with each other. At some point, members of one
group physically attacked members of the other group.
Findings revealed that the aggression perpetrated by
democratic groupmembers against nondemocratic victim
group members was perceived as more legitimate than
any other perpetrator-victim group combination, thereby
providing direct support for the democracy-as-value
hypothesis (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2005). Notably,
degree of severity of the aggressive action did not interact
with group organisation, suggesting that the democracy-
as-value hypothesis was stable across levels of aggression
severity.
Another set of studies tested hypotheses derived from
the democracy-as-value framework directly in a geopo-
litical context. Participants evaluated the legitimacy
of military action initiated by democratic or nondemo-
cratic countries (Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé et al., 2012).
In order to avoid instrumental or identity-related judge-
ments of countries, these studies adopted a third-party
perspective in which military interventions between two
allegedly existent, but in fact ﬁctitious, countries were
evaluated. In addition, given the globalised scale of opin-
ion communication, these studies introduced national
public opinion as another key factor shaping perceived le-
gitimacy of democratic and nondemocratic actions. In line
with procedural justice theories (Tyler & Lind, 1992),
people should expect only egalitarian–democratic gov-
ernments to make decisions based on public opinion.
Moreover, the legitimacy of democratic governments is
largely based on the support or at least tacit public con-
sent for their policies (Glasser & Salmon, 1995). Hence,
we reasoned that perceived popular support should
enhance the legitimacy of military interventions of dem-
ocratic countries, in particular when they target non-
democratic countries. This should be less the case in
nondemocratic contexts for which respondents should
consider public opinion irrelevant, given the assumed
power differential between nondemocratic governments
and populations.
In order to test these hypotheses, participants read
about a conﬂict between two ﬁctitious countries. The
political organisation of perpetrator and victim countries
was experimentally manipulated in both studies, while
public support for military action was either measured
or manipulated. In line with our expectations, both
studies conﬁrmed that direct military action by a demo-
cratic government was perceived as being the
least illegitimate when the democratic population& Sons, Ltd. 899
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democratic country. By demonstrating the legitimising
role of democratic public opinion in backing its gov-
ernment’s hostile actions against a nondemocratic en-
emy, the studies provided further support for the
democracy-as-value hypothesis.
The question of perceived legitimacy of military ac-
tions is not only relevant for conﬂicts between two rival
countries. In international relations, military interven-
tions are often carried out in the name of a superordi-
nate category such as the United Nations or NATO.
Given that dominant voices in these superordinate
categories are represented by countries that pride them-
selves on being democratic, it could be expected that in-
ternational military interventions should be deemed
more legitimate when targeted against nondemocratic
rather than (fellow) democratic countries. This was the
setup for two studies that examined the support for
international military interventions as a function of
the political organisation as well as public opinion of
the target country (Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira, Staerklé,
& Butera, 2012). In this scenario, participants were told
that the international community (i.e. the U.N.) consid-
ered a possible military intervention against a sovereign
country whose government threatened to use military
power against a secessionist region. In order to empha-
sise the hostile character of this intervention, it was
made clear that it would likely cause a massive number
of civilian casualties. In addition, depending on the
study, public support for the aggression against the
secessionist region was either measured or experimen-
tally manipulated. The ﬁndings conﬁrmed the predic-
tion that international military action is more easily
legitimised when it targets aggressive nondemocratic
rather than democratic countries, but only when its
nondemocratic population supported the aggressive
government policy. For democratic target countries,
support for the U.N. intervention was low, irrespective
of democratic public opinion. These studies thereby
suggest that civilian casualties were more acceptable
in nondemocratic rather than democratic contexts, in-
dicating that democratic lives might have been per-
ceived as more valuable than nondemocratic lives.
In addition, the prominent role of nondemocratic pub-
lic opinion (compared to the studies described above
where democratic public opinion justiﬁed its govern-
ment’s aggressive actions) suggests that nondemocratic
public opinion may be used to justify an aggressive act
against them (when they agree with their government)
rather than to justify actions by them (because public
opinion is irrelevant for nondemocratic governments).DEMOCRATIC VALUE PROTECTION AND
COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT
The studies discussed so far have provided convergent
evidence for the democracy-as-value hypothesis,
demonstrating that democratic actions, in particular
when they inﬂict harm on nondemocratic rival groups,
were perceived as more legitimate than the sameEuropean Journal900actions perpetrated by nondemocratic groups, or those
perpetrated at the expense of other democratic groups.
In order to enhance the validity of this general hypoth-
esis, we used another strategy to assess the democracy-
as-value phenomenon, namely collective punishment
for offences committed by democratic or nondemocratic
group members. In line with the early sociological
insight that norm transgressions are a threat to social
order (Durkheim, 1893), punishment of offenders is
seen as a strategy to restore social order and to reafﬁrm
and symbolically protect core values of society (see also
Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Vidmar & Miller, 1980).
An early study using the summer camp paradigm
(Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2007) analysed the per-
ceived legitimacy of collective punishment of demo-
cratic and nondemocratic groups for an offence
committed by their individual group members. The
ﬁndings of this study paralleled the pattern found
with the perceived legitimacy of aggression (Falomir-
Pichastor et al., 2005): collective punishment was
the least legitimate when democratic group members
attacked nondemocratic group members, compared
to the three other conditions. Put otherwise, partici-
pants protected the democratic group from harsh
punishment and thereby symbolically reafﬁrmed the
value of democracy. In addition, the results also re-
vealed that democratic group members who had
attacked nondemocratic members were credited with
higher moral value (in terms of personal attributes
such as being moral, fair, and respectful) than the
other three groups, and that this higher moral value
mediated the effect of group organisation on collective
punishment. This ﬁnding suggests that a legitimising
process was at work in evaluations of aggression
committed by a democratic group against a nondemo-
cratic group, since it is in this condition that demo-
cratic group members were seen as morally superior,
“better” persons.
Having established that democratic groups that have
committed wrongdoings against nondemocratic groups
are likely to be treated relatively leniently and that their
misdeeds are more easily condoned, a closer examina-
tion of the psychological processes involved in this basic
phenomenon is called for. In particular, we wanted to
identify individual-levelmoderators in order to examine
for whom the phenomenon is more or less likely to
occur. In a series of studies (Pereira, Falomir-Pichastor,
Berent, Staerklé, & Butera, 2015), we examined how
individual preference for a democratic or nondemo-
cratic group organisation affected judgements. The
straightforward prediction was that individuals who
strongly endorsed the value of democracy should
exhibit a greater tendency to base their judgements on
the value of democracy, compared to those with a
weaker endorsement of democratic group organisation.
In order to measure the extent to which participants
personally value a democratic group organisation, par-
ticipants ﬁrst read the descriptions of the two types of
groups and then indicated which one of the two types
of groups was fairer, more efﬁcient, had happierof Social Psychology 45 (2015) 896–906 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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ﬁndings of a ﬁrst study using the aforementioned sum-
mer camp paradigm showed that respondents with a
stronger preference for democratic group organisation
punished most severely the nondemocratic offender
group for having attacked a democratic group,
conﬁrming expectations. In order to enhance the eco-
logical validity to these ﬁndings, a second study intro-
duced a new paradigm that involved plagiarism
among university students. Participants were told that
in order to ﬁnalise an assignment, democratically or
nondemocratically organised work groups stole infor-
mation from another workgroup. Again, the ﬁndings
revealed that respondents high in preference for demo-
cratic group organisation protected the democratic stu-
dent group that had stolen information from a
nondemocratic group from collective punishment.
The consistency of these ﬁndings makes it clear that
democracy as a value is an important organising principle
of a wide range of intergroup judgements. The tendency
to shield a democratic group from the consequences of
its misdeeds seems to be widespread, and even en-
hanced among those who explicitly value a democratic
group organisation. Democracy thereby plays a justiﬁ-
catory role in everyday intergroup situations, including
student work contexts and adolescent summer camps.DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
There is a paradox in these ﬁndings: How is it possible
that democratic groups who are expected to collectively
take responsible and informed decisions are suddenly
exempted from anymoral wrongdoing? Could it never-
theless be that, under certain circumstances, democratic
groups would be more severely punished than non-
democratic groups? Democratic accountability should
in fact lead people to consider that democratic group
members are collectively responsible for their decisions,
and thusmore severely punished for groupmisdeeds. In
other words, the purported higher moral standards of
democratic groups should lead people to hold higher
expectations and standards of judgement for democratic
compared to nondemocratic groups.
There is indeed considerable evidence showing that
socially valued groups and individuals such as ingroups
and group leaders do not necessarily receive a more
lenient treatment following their misdeeds. Expectancy
violation theory (Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987), for
example, suggests that people hold high expectations
regarding the behaviour of socially valued groups. As a
result, deviations from the expected behaviour are con-
sidered more serious and lead to a stronger willingness
to sanction these groups (Biernat, Vescio, & Billings,
1999; Jussim et al., 1987). The subjective group dynam-
ics model (Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001), in turn,
speciﬁes the conditions under which valued groups
(ingroups in particular) are more severely punished
than non-valued (out-)groups, thereby reversing the
usual pattern of ingroup favouritism in retributive
judgements. The theory stipulates that if a misdeed byEuropean Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 896–906 Copyright © 2015 John Wileyan ingroup member severely tarnishes the positive
self-image of a group, group members may be moti-
vated to restore this positive image by symbolically
excluding the offending ingroup member. Recent re-
search in retributive justice has demonstrated that
offender responsibility is a key moderator of this mech-
anism.Harsher judgementswere observed in caseswhere
the responsibility of an offender was clear-cut and unam-
biguous and where the offense could not be excused or
minimised. More lenient judgements, in turn, resulted
from ambiguous situations where offender responsibility
was unclear and vague (Van Prooijen, 2006, 2010).
Based on these considerations, it should be possible to
reverse the greatest relative clemency afforded to demo-
cratic group’s aggression against a nondemocratic victim.
A series of studies examined the impact of collective
responsibility (manipulated as the extent to which other
group members could be held accountable for an
individual wrongdoing) on retributive judgements of
democratic and nondemocratic offender groups. Using
various versions of the student plagiarism paradigm,
the summer camp paradigm as well as a new paradigm
on fan violence during an ice hockey game, the ﬁndings
consistently demonstrated that collective responsibility
increased support for collective punishment (Pereira,
Berent, Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, & Butera, 2015).
Importantly, ﬁve studies showed the expected modera-
tion of this effect by the offender group’s social organi-
sation: For democratic groups, support for collective
punishment increased in parallel to their collective re-
sponsibility. For nondemocratic groups, however, there
was in most cases no relationship between collective
responsibility and collective punishment. Additional
analyses suggest that expectancy violations and dam-
age to group value were behind this effect.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In the ﬁrst part of this article, we examined how the
antagonism between democracy and nondemocracy
gives rise to stereotypes of democratic and nondemo-
cratic populations. In line with an idealised conception
of democracy, Western populations were seen as free
and strong, capable of choosing their government
and thus determining the fate of their country. Non-
Western populations, in turn, were viewed as weak,
manipulated, and compliant to a crushing government
(Staerklé, 2005; Staerklé et al., 1998). We then pro-
posed procedural equality as the deﬁning feature of a
democratic social order, and reported research demon-
strating that aggressions perpetrated by democratic
groups against nondemocratic groups were perceived
as more legitimate than any other perpetrator-victim
group combination. These ﬁndings support the idea
that the value of democracy has an instrumental
function in regulating relations between groups
(Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2005, 2007). Other ﬁndings
showed greater support for the intervention of the in-
ternational community (such as the U.N.) against non-
democratic targets. Interestingly, this was the case in& Sons, Ltd. 901
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ported the belligerent policy of its own government
(Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira, et al., 2012). Moreover, di-
rect military action by a democratic government was
perceived as being least illegitimate when the popula-
tion supported their democratic government’s policy
to attack a nondemocratic country (Falomir-Pichastor,
Staerklé, et al., 2012). Finally, the most recent studies
investigated processes underlying retributive justice
judgements as a function of collective responsibility
and moral accountability of democratic and nondemo-
cratic groups (Pereira, Berent et al., 2015) and as a
function of individual endorsement of the value of de-
mocracy (Pereira, Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2015).
In sum, it appears that the value of democracy is
based on the alleged moral and political superiority of
an idealised democratic organisation of national and
other groups. As such, it is a theory about hierarchies
between groups and even nations, much like racism,
sexism, or nationalism. The correct term would then
be “democratism”, denoting the intrinsic superiority of
democracy over other types of group organisation. The
ﬁndings of our research programme suggest that in a
Western country such as Switzerland democratism is
used as a standard of judgement of situations involving
conﬂict between groups that can be differentiated by
their internal organisation. While its main interest lies
in the analysis of judgements of international relations,
democratism also applies to a range of everyday situa-
tions that are disconnected from the political realm.
Democratism provides moral justiﬁcation for harmful
and hostile actions directed towards groups for themere
reason that they are construed as nondemocratic.
Democratism is mainly at work in the context of rival
intergroup relations in which the opposing group is
perceived or strategically construed as lacking the essen-
tial quality of procedural equality of group members.
This equality, however, is largely the product of a nor-
mative or idealised view according to which democratic
group members are by deﬁnition independent, autono-
mous, rational individuals, capable of self-organising as
a social group without the need for powerful leaders
and governments telling themwhat to do. This idealised
view of democratic equality reﬂects a liberal political
philosophy that has been disseminated in Western
societies for over two centuries (see Beauvois, 2005).
Paradoxically, and in line with Orwell’s opening quote,
our ﬁndings demonstrate that the very values of ratio-
nal deliberation and peaceful consensus-seeking on
which a democratic group organisation is founded can
be strategically used to justify nondemocratic forms of
social regulation based on physical force and insufﬁcient
diplomatic efforts.22Even though minority (e.g., civil rights) groups may also appeal to de-
mocracy to justify their actions, they do so from aminority perspective,
that is, their appeal to democracy is more likely a minority strategy de-
signed to justify actions in favour of social change, rather than a major-
ity strategy aimed at legitimising hegemony and negative outgroup
treatment (Staerklé, 2015).
European Journal902A number of issues concerning these studies and their
interpretation should be addressed. First, one might ar-
gue that our ﬁndings merely reﬂect a common ingroup
bias in the sense that participants self-categorise as
members of democratic groups and, in line with social
identity and self-categorisation theory (Tajfel & Turner,
1986), differentiate themselves positively from non-
democratic outgroups with judgements favouring dem-
ocratic groups. This might indeed have been the case in
the studies where the democratic group is explicitly an
ingroup, in particular in the Staerklé et al. (1998)
studies where some participants indicated their national
ingroup (Switzerland) when prompted to think of a
democratic country. Yet, precisely in order to rule out
an ingroup bias explanation of our ﬁndings, in all
subsequent studies we chose ﬁctitious (national, adoles-
cent, student, or sport supporter) groups with which
identiﬁcation was implausible. In addition, in the
Falomir-Pichastor et al. (2005) study we did measure
identiﬁcation with the summer camp groups and found
no mediating effect on the outcome variables. In sum,
identiﬁcation with particular groups and defence of
ingroup interests are not plausible accounts for the ob-
served legitimising effects.
This does notmean, however, that categorisation pro-
cesses are irrelevant to the democracy-as-value ap-
proach. Democratic groups may for example engage in
superordinate categorisation to the extent that they con-
sider themselves as the legitimate representatives of a
superordinate category (for example, when the U.S.
sees itself as the “world police”). In line with the ingroup
projection model (Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus,
2007), democratic ingroups would project their values
onto superordinate categories. This would result in
perceived prototypicality of their (democratic) ingroup
and in (nondemocratic) outgroup difference construed
as deviance, and hence legitimately punishable. Recent
research corroborates such a view, showing that respon-
dents from developed countries perceived their group
as more prototypical of the world population than
citizens from developing countries. These perceptions
of ingroup prototypicality in turn were related to nega-
tive behavioural intentions towards developing coun-
tries and thus to the perpetuation of global inequalities
(Reese, Berthold, & Steffens, 2012). This interpretation
in terms of superordinate projection of democratic
values does not question the validity of our ﬁndings.
Democracy may be a special case of a broader tendency
to use cultural values to legitimise intergroup outcomes
(a “legitimisingmyth”, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), but one
that is speciﬁcally called upon when hostile or immoral
acts of a (dominant) ingroup and negative treatments
of (subordinate) outgroups need to be justiﬁed.
Still other explanations of our effects are possible.
Individuals may for example consider democratically
reached decisions to be of a higher quality than hierar-
chically reached decisions. According to a logic of infor-
mational conformity, people living in democracies (such
as our respondents) may be motivated to validate their
own opinions by endorsing a democratically reachedof Social Psychology 45 (2015) 896–906 Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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racies against nondemocracies. Nevertheless such an
explanation in terms of informational conformity does
not seem plausible either, because in most of our studies
participants were not evaluating group-based decisions
as such, but were rather judging national populations
and governments and evaluating the legitimacy of acts
committed by individual group members.
We should also discuss the implications of our ex-
perimental paradigm that juxtaposes a priori deﬁned
democratic-egalitarian and nondemocratic-hierarchical
groups. This dichotomous categorisation may seem an
oversimpliﬁed, black-and-white approach that runs
the risk of essentialising social groups that usually
combine egalitarian and hierarchical elements. This
choice was nevertheless necessary, because we wanted
to compare judgements on normative ideal-types of
democratic and nondemocratic groups. By no means
do we claim that our operating deﬁnitions represent
accurate proxies of real-world groups; rather they are
core elements of shared representations referred to
by individuals in their everyday thinking.
Regarding the generalisability of the abovementioned
phenomena, we should ﬁrst mention that the 20 pub-
lished studies reported in this review were carried out
over almost two decades and used various participant
samples, including young high school students, univer-
sity students of various disciplines, members of youth
associations (Scouts), and military personnel. This rela-
tive diversity ensures that our conclusions are not solely
based on university students. Nonetheless, the relative
homogeneity of our participants and the fact that our
studies were mostly carried out in one speciﬁc country
(Switzerland, two studies were carried out in France)
does raise the question of the generalisability of our
ﬁndings to more general processes occurring in the
Westernworld. It is worth reiterating that our research
is speciﬁcally concerned with Western representations,
and we certainly do not claim any universality to the
democracy-as-value hypothesis. A historically contin-
gent understanding of the differentiation between
“Europeans” and “Non-Europeans” suggests that our
ﬁndings can most plausibly be generalised to other
Western European countries, and possibly also to other
English-speaking Western countries such as the U.S.
The question whether the observed ﬁndings could
be replicated in non-Western countries cannot easily
be answered, as there are good reasons why they
should (because some might endorse Western ideas
of liberal democracy), but also good reasons why they
should not (because some might deﬁne themselves
against Western ideas of liberal democracy). It is an
empirical issue worth studying in itself. We do how-
ever believe that the convergent ﬁndings from our re-
search programme allow a generalisation that goes
beyond the Swiss context where most studies were
carried out, even though we cannot exclude the possi-
bility that the speciﬁcities of the Swiss political system
(direct democracy, numerous popular votes) affected
our ﬁndings.European Journal of Social Psychology 45 (2015) 896–906 Copyright © 2015 John WileyAnother issue concerns the psychological motiva-
tions underlying our results. We made it clear that
we view our ﬁndings as essentially driven by political
and ideological motives, that is, people prefer and
defend egalitarian–democratic groups because they
see democracy in itself as a value and treat it as a
normative ideal groups and societies should strive for.
On an individual level, we argued that this preference
for egalitarianism is rooted in procedural justice,
because egalitarian groups offer important psychologi-
cal beneﬁts (voice, respect, identity, etc.) compared to
hierarchical groups. On a collective level, we can only
speculate about the origins of this kind of thinking.
Nevertheless, we see it as an expression of widely
disseminated common sense knowledge—social repre-
sentations (Moscovici, 1988)—that guides and orients
judgements of intergroup legitimacy. These representa-
tions are acquired through various channels of everyday
communication, including media exposure, education,
formal and informal discussion with friends, parents,
teachers, and so on (see Glasser & Salmon, 1995). Repre-
sentations of democracy need not be consensual; some
individuals may be better informed and more knowl-
edgeable about world affairs, whereas others may
have a critical and negative attitude towards demo-
cratic and Western countries. Nevertheless, social
representations of democracy still constitute common
sense, taken-for-granted reference knowledge drawn
upon by citizens to discuss difﬁcult and complicated
issues. It is even likely that representations of
democracy can be seen as what Moscovici (1988)
called “hegemonic representations”, that is, pervasive
large-scale social order narratives and systems of
classiﬁcation that deﬁne historical eras and societies
(see Staerklé, 2015).
This representational approach is not necessarily in-
compatible with other accounts of legitimising pro-
cesses, for example motivated cognition theories that
focus on the psychological beneﬁts of legitimacy
(e.g., Jost et al., 2010). Our account differs frommotiva-
tional theories inasmuch as democracy judgements in
our paradigm do not primarily serve psychological
needs, but rather reﬂect the inﬂuence of shared, ideo-
logical knowledge on intergroup judgements. People
are primarily “motivated” to defend democracy not
because it makes them feel good about themselves, but
because they have learned that democracy is “good”.
From a more historical perspective, the legitimising
representations of democracy uncovered in our studies
can be viewed as the reﬂection of longstanding persua-
sive and strategic communication strategies advanced
by Western elites in order to justify Western hegemony
(Said, 1978). Pitting the West against the rest of the
world has become amainstay ofWestern political think-
ing. Many Western leaders seem to use these simpliﬁed
and distorted global dichotomies to justify aggressive
foreign policy decisions, while milder manifestations of
the antagonism are also found in both scientiﬁc and
common sense discourse. In 1992, Francis Fukuyama
published his inﬂuential book on the “End of history”,& Sons, Ltd. 903
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and most accomplished form of human government.
At the same time, Samuel Huntington (1993) devel-
oped a related “West against the rest” argument, sug-
gesting that the major source of conﬂict in the future
will be based on cultural differences between global
geopolitical regions. Both of these widely known texts
are based on arguments of liberal hegemony associ-
ated with the Western world. By and large, we could
say that the participants’ responses in our studies
reﬂect Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s logic inasmuch
as they reveal this alleged intrinsic superiority of
Western countries. Interestingly, such conceptions of
inter-societal hierarchy in lay thinking were also
found in a study on folk beliefs about globalisation
in China, Japan, and Australia (Kashima et al.,
2011). It shows that lay perceivers believe that socie-
ties develop from a traditional community where
people are trustworthy though unsophisticated to a
more sophisticated, but less warm-hearted modern
society. The global value-perceptions approach that
we have developed in the present article, in turn,
unveils the pervasive psychological power of repre-
sentations of global categories in justifying power
arrangements in favour of the Western world.
This raises the question of our own positioning to-
wards the issueswe study. In stark contrast to Fukuyama
andHuntington,we doubt the thesis of liberal hegemony
(see Derrida, 1994). In line with George Orwell’s open-
ing quote, our studies challenge the strategic and political
(mis-)use of consensually positive cultural values by
unmasking their hidden meanings, which are actually
at odds with their original meaning. This goal is not
speciﬁc to our research, but reﬂects the very reason of
existence of many other disciplines in the social sciences.
By demonstrating how lay people in aWestern country
associate the idea of democracy to “good” people and to
“good” actions (see Crandall & Beasley, 2001, for a
related argument), we question the convenient and
taken-for-granted truth of the moral good of democ-
racy. Following the colloquialism that “ﬁsh do not no-
tice the water they are swimming in”, for people living
in Western democracies the moral good of democracy
may be like aﬁsh’swater. Our goal is to better understand
the ideological water Western populations swim in.3REFERENCES
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